Legally Defining Religious Belief

The Statutory Definition Is Far More Expansive and Accommodating Than Common Understanding

Disclaimer

The author of this article is not an attorney and not authorized to practice law in Ohio. Nothing presented in this document is to be taken as legal advice. Everything presented here is personal opinion derived from extensive research and is for informational purposes only. Feel free to reach out for clarification or recommended revisions.

Introduction

The purpose of this analysis was to examine the difference between the statutory definition of sincere religious belief vs. the common understanding of what a sincere religious belief is by comparing the common understanding with the descriptions the Supreme Court cases used to determine how to evaluate whether a religious objection was sincere or not.

First will be a review what the common understanding is. Then a review of three particular cases: Berman v. United States, United States v. Seeger, and Welsh v. United States, each of which examined the religious claims of conscientious objectors who wished to be relieved of the requirement to serve in the military when the military draft was still in place, will be presented. Finally, a conclusion will be presented clarifying how the statutory definition differs from the common understanding.

The three cases mentioned above provide one with the federal test for a valid religious claim and give examples of what claims are valid and what claims aren’t. Once one has compared the tests used in the cases to gauge what a sincere religious exemption is statutorily speaking, one can see that it is a far broader and more lenient definition than the common understanding as one does not need to claim a belief in a Supreme Being, be a member of a church, or quote scriptures from their religion’s holy texts in order for their belief to be considered “religious.”

The cases below will demonstrate that the statutory definition only requires two things:

• That one claim some kind of belief in a force greater than human authority that they have a duty to and

• That the belief occupies a place in them that is parallel to that of those who do claim a belief in God

And, you will also see that the statutory definition does not require any of the following:

• Membership in a recognized denomination

• A letter from a clergy member

• Quoting of biblical scripture or other holy texts

• Submission of church doctrine to support one’s claim

• Any mention of praying or meditating

• Any claim of being a frequent member of a church, synagogue, or temple

• Any claim of having publicly declared any faith to others

The Common Understanding of What It Means to Be Religious

There is no common standard for what it means to be religious. Some people who attend church regularly and consider themselves devout Christians do not feel that they are religious when they compare themselves with others in their church. Others may only show up to the local church on Christmas Eve and Easter and consider themselves religious simply because they belong to a church and were raised as Christians. And there are others who only show up on Christmas and Easter who wouldn’t dare to call themselves religious.

But, when it comes to claiming a religious exemption to a requirement or a mandate, there seems to be a common assumption that one or all of the following would likely be required in order to qualify as having a sincere religious belief that:

• They belong to a recognized denomination

• The denomination has a stated doctrine that backs their objection

• A letter from a clergy member from that denomination that supports their religious objection will be required

• They will need to quote biblical or other sacred scripture from the texts of their religion that supports their claim

Because of this common understanding, most people who don’t belong to a recognized denomination or attend a local church don’t feel they qualify as being “religious” if they cannot satisfy the above requirements. Some people may follow the teachings of denominations that are not necessarily established, but still might not feel that they are “religious” because they don’t actually go to church and may not meditate or pray. And even many people that do belong to a recognized or local denomination may not describe themselves as religious if they don’t attend regularly, pray or meditate, or publicly profess their faith to others. And still, even devout followers of a recognized faith may feel they don't qualify because the faith has no stated doctrine that supports their personal religious objection to a given mandate.

So, as you can see, determining whether someone is religious based on the common understanding is not an easy task as there is no actual fixed common definition. And even people who may be considered religious to some wouldn’t consider themselves religious based on who they are comparing themselves to. But the statutory definition is fixed and it provides a test one can use to determine if they actually meet the statutory definition of what it means to be religious, thereby removing the confusion.

A Review of Supreme Court Cases that Evaluated Religious Claims

The three cases mentioned above in the introduction, Berman, Seeger and Welsh, clearly provide a method to determine if one’s beliefs would qualify for the statutory definition of “religious.” These cases involved people that refused to be inducted into the Armed Forces based on religious claims that they were conscientious objectors. The basic statutory requirement for a conscientious objector was that they claim that due to “religious training and belief” that they were conscientiously opposed to war in any form. That definition evolved over time as a result of these cases. Below is a brief timeline of the laws that were passed that contained the conscientious objector definition along with the three cases. This analysis will display the changes that occurred over time and discuss the specific challenges to that definition that occurred in the Supreme Court cases and the resulting changes to the definitions that occurred based on the decisions of those cases.

Timeline

1916 - National Defense Act passed

1940 - Selective Training and Service Act passed

1946 - Berman v. United States decided

1948 - Military Service Act of 1948 passed

1965 - United States v. Seeger decided

1967 - Military Service Act of 1948 Amended

1969 - Welsh v. United States decided

1916 - National Defense Act

“[A whole list of military positions] shall be exempt from militia duty without regard to age, and all persons who because of religious belief shall claim exemption from military service, if the conscientious holding of such belief by such person shall be established under such regulations as the President shall prescribe, shall be exempted from militia service in a combatant capacity [emphasis added].”

The National Defense Act definition was altered in 1940 prior to the Berman case being decided in 1946, but it is listed here as a reference to show what was in place prior to the change in 1940 when the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 was passed. According to the National Defense Act, one was exempt if they claimed a religious belief and the President was authorized to set regulations to establish the belief. It does not appear that there was any requirement at the time to claim to be a member of a religious denomination. But regardless, as you will see in the cases below that there certainly was not any requirement after 1940.

1940 - Selective Training and Service Act:

“Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form [emphasis added].”

In this Act, the requirement for “religious belief” was expanded from the 1916 version to include both religious belief and training and to clarify that one must be opposed to war in any form, not just the war they were being inducted to fight.

1946 - Berman v. United States

Berman’s claim of a conscientious objection was denied because it was determined that he provided no evidence to support that his claims were based on any religious training and belief. Rather, it was found that his claims were only based only on political, sociological and philosophical views. So his case presents a good example of what a claim based on those views is like because such a claim is not clarified in the Seeger or Welsh cases discussed below.

Berman was very active in the Los Angeles branch of a national group called Your Committee Against War. He was “opposed to all war and had made speeches on the question of war; his attitude on the question of war was based on his conscience and fundamental belief in, and devotion to, the brotherhood of all men.” Yet, he denied that he believed in any deity. Regardless of this admission, among the evidence he provided to back his claim of religious belief was a few letters from clergy members and a professor of theology supporting his claim.

But although the letters claimed that he was sincere in his beliefs and one even claimed that he was certain that Mr. Berman’s claims were based on religious belief (while one said they weren’t so sure), none of the letters of support mentioned anything about a belief in a deity or any duty that was superior to human relations which appears to be what the Berman court wanted as evidence of religious training and belief.

The court did not question Mr. Berman’s sincerity, but they felt that he did not express any duty to a higher authority by stating:

“It is our opinion that the expression ‘by reason of religious training and belief’ is plain language, and was written into the statute for the specific purpose of distinguishing between a conscientious social belief, or a sincere devotion to a high moralistic philosophy, and one based upon an individual's belief in his responsibility to an authority higher and beyond any worldly one.”

They also quoted another previous case that stated that:

“The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation.”

And they concluded that he couldn’t qualify as a conscientious objector based on religious training and belief by stating:

“There are those who have a philosophy of life, and who live up to it. There is evidence that this is so in regard to appellant. However, no matter how pure and admirable his standard may be, and no matter how devotedly he adheres to it, his philosophy and morals and social policy without the concept of deity cannot be said to be religion in the sense of that term as it is used in the statute.”

The Berman Court essentially equated believing in a deity with some kind of duty “superior to those arising from any human relation.” So, the essential ingredients for claiming a sincere religious objection were:

• Claiming belief in some kind of deity and

• Claiming a duty to some kind of power that is superior to human relations

And it should be noted that what was not required was any:

• Membership in a recognized denomination

• A letter from a clergy member

• Quoting of biblical scripture or other holy texts

• Submission of church doctrine to support one’s claim

• Mention of praying or meditating

• Claim of being a frequent member of a church, synagogue, or temple

• Claim of having publicly declared any faith to others

It was this very example that was used by the Seeger and Welsh courts to evaluate whether or not a religious claim was in fact only political, sociological or philosophical. And, it is interesting in this case that even having letters from clergy members didn’t assist his claim.

1948 - Military Service Act of 1948:

“(j) Nothing contained in this title [sections 451-454 and 455-471 of this Appendix] shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code [emphasis added].”

The change in the definition related to “religious training and belief” that occurred in 1948 does in fact appear to be directly related to the Berman decision. It is as if they extracted quotes from the case and placed them right in the definition to clarify the meaning of “religious training and belief.”

1965 - United States v. Seeger

Seeger’s claim was originally denied because it was not based upon a “belief in a Supreme Being” since he did not answer yes or no to the question of whether or not there is a Supreme Being on his conscientious objector application.

He challenged the addition of the required belief in a Supreme Being claiming it was unconstitutional for two reasons: “(1) The section does not exempt nonreligious conscientious objectors; and (2) it discriminates between different forms of religious expression in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” It should be stated that Seeger did not claim to be an atheist so the court did not apply this decision to include atheists.

But the appeals court reversed the trial court saying that the requirement to state a belief in a Supreme Being was an “impermissible classification” because it distinguished “between internally derived and externally compelled beliefs.” In other words, Seeger demonstrated an internally derived belief based on religious belief and training because he came to the conclusions on his own rather than by attending a church or being a member of a religious organization.

The Supreme Court, which upheld the appellate court, stated that “his ‘skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God’ did ‘not necessarily mean lack of faith in anything whatsoever’; He cited such personages as Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical belief in intellectual and moral integrity ‘without belief in God, except in the remotest sense.’ His belief was found to be sincere, honest, and made in good faith; and his conscientious objection to be based upon individual training and belief, both of which included research in religious and cultural fields.”

Rather than declare the requirement to believe in a Supreme Being unconstitutional, the Supreme Court chose to liberally interpret the definition of Supreme Being to include both theistic views (those that believed in a deity) and nontheistic beliefs (those that didn’t believe in a deity) as long as they also met the requirements for religious belief and training, which was essentially that they claim that they believed in a duty to some entity that was superior to human relations. This expansion of the definition of Supreme Being essentially rendered it meaningless and it was later removed from the definition in 1967 as a result as can be seen in the definition change below.

So a key factor to understand is that even if one does not claim to believe in a Supreme Being and comes to their own conclusions of some power greater than human relations on their own, that qualifies as a valid religious belief. It doesn’t seem to matter what one studied to come to that conclusion as long as the conclusion resolved to a belief in some power greater than human relations that one has a duty to.

The Test

The Seeger Court declared a simple test for sincerity: “The test of religious belief within the meaning of the exemption in § 6(j) [50 USC 456(j)] is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption. The exemption does not cover those who oppose war from a merely personal moral code nor those who decide that war is wrong on the basis of essentially political, sociological or economic considerations rather than religious belief.”

As noted in Berman, the factor that distinguished a religion belief from a political, sociological or philosophical one was “that individual belief — rather than membership in a church or sect — determined the duties that God imposed upon a person in his everyday conduct; [and that] there is a higher loyalty than loyalty to this country, loyalty to God." Of course, God here was replaced by any concept of a force greater than that of human authority.

So the Seeger court relaxed the religious requirement by no longer requiring a claim in a Supreme Being. Therefore the requirements for a religious claim became:

• Claiming that one is not an atheist

• Claiming a duty to some kind of power that is superior to human relations whether or not that included belief in a Supreme Being

And the Seeger Court still did not require any of the following:

• Membership in a recognized denomination

• A letter from a clergy member

• Quoting of biblical scripture or other holy texts

• Submission of church doctrine to support one’s claim

• Any mention of praying or meditating

• Any claim of being a frequent member of a church, synagogue, or temple

• Any claim of having publicly declared any faith to others

1967 - Military Universal Training and Service Act Amended:

“(j) Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious, training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. As used in this subsection, the term 'religious training and belief’ does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code [emphasis added].”

As a result of the Seeger decision, the definition was again revised to remove the requirement to state a belief in a Supreme Being.

1969 - Welsh v. United States

Welsh, who submitted his claim for conscientious objector status prior to 1965, was originally denied conscientious objector status. But by the time his case came before the Supreme Court, the definition had been changed which removed the requirement to claim a belief in a Supreme Being. Welsh stated that he:

• Was not a member of any church

• Did not have an opinion on euthanasia

• Had no opinion on when life begins in the womb

• Did not believe the taking of a life was a religious wrong but simply as a social "error," or illogical act

• Did not believe in life after death

• Did not believe in a god or any entity with authority over man

• Did believe, though, in the ‘laws of nature’ that are ‘outside or beyond the control of men’

But what differentiated Welsh from soneone whose views were based solely on political, socialogical or philisophical views are a moral code was:

• He believed that “both ethical and religious values usually arise from the same source: the individual’s concern for other individuals” and that “this concern [each individual’s concern for the rest]... is implicit in all religious belief… still acts to govern people’s relationships.”

• Originally he didn’t call himself religious because he didn’t want to mislead people to believe that he believed in God, but that he himself considered his beliefs to be religious regardless.

The court stated that “the claim of the registrant that his belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be given great weight.”

The Welsh court applied a two part test:

“Once it is determined that the basic belief does not derive exclusively from political, sociological or philosophical views, or a purely personal moral code, the source of the belief ceases to be a relevant subject of inquiry. The question then is only whether it is held with the requisite strength.

Under Seeger, 380 U.S., at 176 and 184, 85 S.Ct. 850, it is held with the requisite strength if it occupies the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption.”

“It didn’t matter that Welsh’s beliefs were predicated in part on political, sociological or philosophical views and a moral code, since he had a religious motivation. It is only if his views were solely based on those things would it have been denied.”

So the court confirmed again that the requirements for a religious claim were:

• Claiming that one is not an atheist

• It helps to claim that they are religious but that is not a requirement

• But ultimately they must claim a duty to some kind of power that is superior to human relations

And the Welsh Court still did not require any of the following:

• Membership in a recognized denomination

• A letter from a clergy member

• Quoting of biblical scripture or other holy texts

• Submission of church doctrine to support one’s claim

• Any mention of praying or meditating

• Any claim of being a frequent member of a church, synagogue, or temple

• Any claim of having publicly declared any faith to others

Conclusion

Although these cases were specific to conscientious objection against the taking of human life, the evaluation of the sincerity of one’s religious views by the Supreme Court has been memorialized in the public record now going back to 1946, almost 80 years as of the time of this writing.

It should now be clear from the analysis above that the statutory requirements for a religious objection are far more expansive and lenient than what one would believe the common understanding to require. Not only does one not need to be a member of a church, they do not need to claim belief in any deity or Supreme Being, submit letters from clergy members, quote biblical scripture, or even claim to actively pray or meditate. In fact, in many cases, the claim is quite similar to what one would consider to be a political, sociological or philosophical view. The only differences appear to be that one claims that their belief not be predicated merely on political, sociological or philosophical views because they recognize some power superior to that of human relations that they feel they have a duty to and that that belief occupies a place in themselves equal to that of one who would profess a faith in God.

Therefore, any person that has any belief that they do believe in any kind of power or force that they feel a duty to abide by that is greater than human authority, and that that belief occupies in them a place parallel to that of other people that do claim a belief in a God, then they would likely qualify as having a sincere religious belief despite not being the member of any church, having the support of any clergy member or quoting any religious texts, even it is a belief that they have come to based on their own study.

The important point to recognize here is that someone who might not consider themselves to be religious based on the common understanding that one must be a member of a church, have the support of a clergy member, or be able to quote religious texts not only could consider themselves to be religious based on the statutory definition, but is religious based on the statutory definition as long as they feel some duty to a force greater than human authority and that that belief occupies a place in their life parallel to that as anyone who does believe in God.